Updated : 06-Jan-2005

Two decades before us, the Germans got it right. This is from 1988, visiting a Bundeswehr sister unit. This overpressured vehicle was not in U.S. soldiers' hands until the Gulf War, when we were confronted with the real chance of chemical warfare and borrowed some Fuchs for chemical reconnaissance.

A lot of interests, from officers and aquisition bureaucrats, to CEOs to politicians, conflate "national security" with branch prestige, career interest, corporate profitability, and reelection interest. This may compromise real national security and the safety of real soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Sometimes the military waits for a more expensive (smaller fleet or less money for parts and training) and sometimes the desire for homegrown equipment deadends. An abortive instance was the Sergeant York, a kluge of M48 chassis, custom turret, 40 mm cannons, and new radars. This was allegedly to address an urgent Soviet helicopter threat. But if it was really so urgent, and if we were interested in fighting along side the Germans, we should simply have bought the fully fielded and tested Gepard, shown below.

The Germans had fielded a superior infantry fighting vehicle, and were working on a second generation, while we rolled around in Vietnam era M113s, waiting for the kinks to be worked out of the Bradley. Same for the Abrams tank versus Leopard II. If our aquisition program was really aligned with our plans to fight along side the Germans, why weren't we building their outstanding equipment under license on our shores, creating redundent production capacity for two armies in case of war in Europe? No padding of corporate accounts with R &: D costs, more money for workers' and servicemembers' wages and repair parts.