A couple pieces of interest in The Atlantic
Tuesday, August 30th, 2005Swan song for the death penalty? Benjamin Wittes hopes SCOTUS will defeat the public will on the long march rather than causing another backlash with a judicial fiat. But will someone yell “Freebird!” if SCOTUS takes the “In-A-Gadda-Da-Vida” approach? And will Roberts play along or change the tune?
In large measure the shift emanates from a change of heart in what were the Court’s two swing justices: Anthony Kennedy and the soon-to-retire Sandra Day O’Connor. Once solidly part of the bloc that deferred to state convictions and procedures, both evidently had second thoughts. Back in 1991, for example, O’Connor wrote the Court opinion refusing to even consider the case of Roger Keith Coleman . . . [openning], “This is a case about federalism.” A decade later, however, she was singing a different tune. “Serious questions are being raised about whether the death penalty is being fairly administered in this country,” she said in a 2001 speech in Minnesota. “Minnesota doesn’t have it, and you must breathe a big sigh of relief every day.”
Kennedy’s shift has been just as dramatic. In 1989, for example, Kennedy signed Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion upholding the death penalty for people who committed their offenses as juveniles. This year he wrote the opinion striking down the juvenile death penalty, and in doing so he explicitly repudiated several of the methodological premises of the Scalia opinion he had signed.
It has been noted elsewhere that the courts act where there is already some support in public or governing elite opinion. So the following passage provides context for the two jurists shift:
As DNA exonerated growing numbers of prisoners through the 1990s, the public grew more skeptical toward capital punishment in general, realizing that even when juries are sure of a person’s guilt, they are sometimes dead wrong. Although polls still show majority support for the death penalty, that support is shrinking. Juries are handing down fewer death sentences. Executions countrywide, after reaching a modern-day high of ninety-eight in 1999, declined to fifty-nine last year. Judges are not immune from the anxieties that have led to these trends.
A death penalty opponent, Benjamin Wittes is actually against the court completely abolishing the death penalty right now.
In their ill-fated 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgiawhich came down at a time when capital punishment was on the decline anywaythey effectively struck down the death-penalty statutes of every state in the country that had them. The intense public reaction against the decision provoked many states to rewrite their capital-punishment laws to comply with the Court’s new standardsmuch as the current backlash against judicially mandated recognition for gay marriage is prompting state constitutional amendments that limit marriage to heterosexual couples. [ . . . ] By denying the public the option of a penalty that, although disfavored by elites, was supportedthen as nowby much of the polity at large, the courts intensified public commitment to it. With capital punishment once again on the wane, justices uncomfortable with it would be deeply foolish to repeat that mistake.
So the left wing is raising bureaucratic obstacles instead of openly standing against the will of the people.
Despite O’Connor’s retirement, the Court’s new approach seems likely to impose significant constraints on capital punishment, but ones that will be largely invisible to the public. The Court will probably not be striking down many laws, but the justices will tighten the screws by scrutinizing individual cases enough to further isolate the death penalty regionally and to raise its political and financial costs.
It seems to me that the answer is in the blogosphere: lawyers calling out the trends and individual cases, perhaps with allied social scientists and medical/ forensic experts, by justice and groups of justices over time. Every lauditory column from the organ formerly known as the Paper of Record should be answered or even led by a swarm of reasoned, documented approbrium.
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Also of note in The Atlantic: Robert Kaplan’s latest Imperial Grunts
The essence of military “transformation”the Washington buzzword of recent yearsis not new tactics or even weapons systems but bureaucratic reorganization. In fact, such reorganization was achieved in the weeks following 9/11 by the 5th Special Forces Group, based in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, whose handful of A teams (with help from the CIA, Air Force Special Ops embeds, and others) conquered Afghanistan.
The relationship between 5th Group and the highest levels of Pentagon officialdom had, in those precious, historic weeks of the fall of 2001, evinced the organizational structure that distinguished al-Qaeda and also the most innovative global corporations. It was an arrangement with which the finest business schools and management consultants would have been impressed. The captains and team sergeants of the various 5th Group A teams did not communicate with the top brass through an extended, vertical chain of command. They weren’t even given specific instructions. They were just told to link up with the indigsthe Northern Alliance and also friendly Pashtoonsand help them defeat the Taliban. And to figure out the details as they went along.
The result was the empowerment of master sergeants to call in B-52 strikes. Fifth Group was no longer a small part of an enormous defense bureaucracy. It became a veritable corporate spinoff, commissioned to do a specific job its very own way, in the manner of a top consultant.
After the Secretary of Defense applauded this, his organization throttled it.
But as time went on, that operating procedure came to an end. Now what had previously been approved orally within minutes took three days of paperwork, with bureaucratic layers of lieutenant colonels and senior officers delaying operations and diluting them of risk. When hits finally took place, they more than likely turned up dry holes. One of the basic laws of counterinsurgency warfare, established in the Marines’ Small Wars Manual (1940) and the British Colonel C. E. Callwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1896), was being ignored: Get out of the compound and out among the local people, preferably in small numbers. Yet the CJTF-180 in Bagram, by demanding forms and orders for almost every excursion outside the firebase, acted as a restraint on its Special Forces troops, whose whole purpose was to fight unconventionally in “small wars” style.
Summary:
Several years into the war on terrorism, one would think that Pashto would be commonly spoken, at least on a basic level, by American troops in these borderlands. It isn’t. Nor are Farsi and Urduthe languages of Iran and the tribal agencies of Pakistan, where U.S. Special Operations forces are likely to be active, in one way or another, over the coming decade. Like Big Army’s aversion to beards, the lack of linguistic preparedness demonstrates that the Pentagon bureaucracy pays too little attention to the most basic tool of counterinsurgency: adaptation to the cultural terrain. It is such adaptationmore than new weapons systems or an ideological commitment to Western democracythat will deliver us from quagmires. [emphasis added]
There is a name and a face associated with the CJTF and with responsibility for funding and conducting language training. If Kaplan is right in his assessment of the constraints on SF, there are actually specific bellybuttons to push under wartime circumstances. If someone objects to beards, someone else can send someone a short note about prio